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Abstract  
This paper constitutes a new endeavor of investigating competitive conditions in 
European banking. Since the vast literature of competition modeling has produced 
mixed results, the proposed methodology goes one step further in order to investigate 
the intensity of key effects on bank competition as decomposed into specific bank 
activities. The sample comprises nine of the most developed banking markets in the 
European region during the period 2002-2010. The concluding remarks over the 
explanatory power of traditional collusion, relative market power and efficiency 
alongside other key controls on bank pricing conduct, provide considerable policy 
implications. 
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1. Introduction 
A significant number of empirical applications of contemporary competition 
modeling has proposed indicators of market structure that suffer from either limited 
comparability across European countries and over time (Bolt and Humphrey, 2010). 
The structural approach, that is concentration ratios capturing the structural features 
of a market, is used in models or interpreted in conjunction with other performance 
measures to explain the competitive behavior of a specific industry without sufficing 
stand-alone to extrapolate competitive conditions. Even changes in concentration can 
be deduced regarding market entries and exits, a feature widely used in U.S for anti-
trust purposes.  
The next step of the literature is to build up a link between structural changes 
and bank performance, mainly on the grounds of the Relative Efficiency (RE) and the 
Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm (SCP). Non-structural measures developed 
in response to potential endogeneity and deficiencies of structural models to quantify 
bank competition based upon the pricing conduct - the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) approach. Another case may be the degree of contestability in a 
bank market; few banks implement competitive pricing as price takers in order to 
discourage ‘hit and run’ behavior of new entries and thereby second their monopoly 
power.  
Eschewing from conventional competition modeling, Heffernan (2002) tests 
for contestability and Cournot/Salop-Stiglitz behavior in UK banking industry by 
proposing a general linear model of competitive pricing of the important retail 
banking products: deposits, loans, credit cards and mortgages. There is also 
considerable attention in the literature to the so-called Boone indicator that measures 
competitive conditions insofar as they are expressed by efficiency dynamics. The 
most recent models coming to shed light on the cross-country comparability of 
alternative competition measures and incorporate the switch of banking income to 
not-interest bearing sources are those of Carbo et al. (2009) and Bolt and Humphrey 
(2010), respectively. The econometric analysis applies an error-correction 
specification to distill competition measures from country-specific effects, and 
stochastic frontier methodology to provide rankings of banking sectors in terms of 
relative competitive measures of market structure.  
This paper addresses the key effects of market power as proxied by the Lerner 
index not only in its aggregate form but also with respect to key income sources. The 
contribution therefore is threefold: a) the sample is focusing on nine developed 
countries within the European union since the advent of Euro in order to particularly 
focus on Europe up until the crack of the financial crisis, b) the emphasis is placed on 
the measurement of marginal costs in order to abstain from potential bias triggered by 
traditional modelling in the literature and c) it is the first time that potential effects on 
market power are identified at the income level.  
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. Cross-country studies of competition testing 
The most widely applied methodology that falls within the NEIO approach is 
that of Panzar and Rosse (1987), identifying European samples classified in transition 
and developed economies along with other versions like EU-10, EU-15, European 
Monetary Union (EMU), Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) or other sub-regions. 
Monopolistic competition is quite common in large European samples in Staikouras 
and Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki (2006), in the EU-15 group according to Casu and 
Girardone (2006) and in the developing (EU-12) region in the run up to the adoption 
of Euro (Weill, 2004). Delis et al. (2008) similarly found the PR statistic between 0 
and 1 for Greece, Latvia and Spain during the period 1993-2004
2
.  
The Bresnahan-Lau methodology has met a handful of cross-country 
applications relatively to the popularity of PR statistic. In particular, an international 
sample is studied by Shaffer (2001) covering North America, Europe and Asia during 
the period 1979-1991. They provide evidence over contestability or, alternatively, 
Cournot-like oligopoly in Belgium, Denmark, France, Japan and US whereas 
competitive structures are evident in Canada, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden and 
Finland.  
Neven and Röller (1999) argued about colluding behavior in the banking 
markets of Belgium, France, Spain, Germany, Denmark and UK over the period 
1981-1999, albeit with a considerable diminishing trend over time. Last, Delis et al. 
(2008) applied additional dynamic error-correction specifications along the lines of 
Steen and Salvanes (1999) and concluded about potential bias of static models when 
they fail to capture short-run dynamics. Indeed, monopolistic competition is generally 
evident but in dynamic models the market power is relatively higher. Bikker (2003) 
report on a European sample within the period 1987-1997 with respect to deposits and 
lending markets. Especially, the deposit markets of the entire European region as well 
as those of Germany and Spain operate under monopolistic competition, while at the 
same time the same holds for the lending markets of Germany, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and UK. 
                                                        
2 On the contrary, Molyneux et al. (1994) found monopoly conditions in Italy during the sub-period 
1987-1989.  
 
The Lerner index has been widely applied in the banking literature especially 
investigating correlations of the degree of competition with other contemporary 
competitive isssues. Hence, it is rarely juxtaposed to the aforementioned 
methodologies so as to compare and thereby challenge the robust persistence of 
market power levels. Exception to this pattern is the study of Turk Ariss (2010), 
which identifies biases of efficiency and monopoly power embedded in the estimation 
of marginal costs. In addition, Carbo et al. (2009) made cross-country comparisons of 
various measures of competition by subtracting the macroeconomic effect with the 
Distribution-Free Approach (DFA).      
 
2.2. Potential effects on competition 
Claessens and Laeven (2004) investigated several effects on structural H-
statistic for 50 countries over the period 1994-2001. They raised the issue that there is 
no need to have low concentration in order to experience competitive conditions 
(contestability). Rather the latter is also favoured by foreign-owned banks and limited 
restrictions on non traditional activities. On the other hand, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) argue that interest margins are positively (negatively) related to 
foreign ownership (asset size), corporate tax and concentration across 80 countries 8 
years prior to 1995. Hawtrey and Liang (2008) also investigate interest margins 
within the OECD group for the period 1987-2001. The evidence shows that scale 
effects tend to shrink profit margins while the opposite holds for market power, cost 
inefficiency, risk aversion, volatility of real interest rate and credit risk.  
After a long-lasting period of segmented banking system in Europe and 
volatility in interest rates that induced high mergins
3
, De Guevara et al. (2005) found 
no significance of collusion and relative market power hypotheses despite the ongoing 
deregulation process during the period 1992-1999. However, the more efficiency 
gains, default risk and the intensity of the economic cycle, the more inclined are 
financial institutions to behave monopolistically in the developed region. In contrast, 
the SCP hpothesis does hold across 31 European countries during 1994-2001 insofar 
as foreign ownership is employed (Clayes and Vander Vennet, 2008). The analysis 
also reports monopolistic tendency when banks enjoy more capital and engage in 
lending due to the integration of cost-effective risk management techniques. 
Khiabani and Hamidisahneh (2012) conducted analysis on the Iranian banking 
sector and observed how the estimated market power increased over the period 1996-
2006 in response to the deregulation of the market in the form of market entries. In 
particular, bank competition remained stable (until 2000) as soon as entry 
derestrictions took place and made them act more competitively.  
Nguyen et al. (2012) found a non-linear relationship between market power 
and income diversification. Banks with low marker power engage in revenue 
diversification, while incumbent banks seem to turn into traditional interest-bearing 
activities in the ASEAN region. 
 
3. Methodology 
The underlying paper estimates the price mark-up over marginal cost 
combining the estimation of average prices and marginal costs at the bank level.  The 
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 See Saunders and Schumacher (2000). 
average prices are estimated over total assets (TA) along the lines of Shaffer (1993) 
and Berg and Kim (1994), instead of other earning assets in an attempt to expand as 
much as possible the observations of the sample since 2002. First, I have to estimate 
marginal costs by means of running a translog cost function, similar to the version of 
Turk Ariss (2010) that excludes the use of price of borrowed funds as input price on 
the grounds that it presumably captures some degree of monopoly power of 
incumbent banks in the deposits market. The employed model takes the following 
form:  
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where TC: total costs, Q: total assets, W1: price of labour (personnel expenses over 
total assets), W2: price of physical capital (other operating expenses over fixed 
assets), Z1: fixed assets deflated by total equity, Z2: Off-balance sheet activities (non-
interest operating income) deflated by total equity and T: time trend. I introduce fixed 
effects to account for different bank specificities and run model 1 separately for each 
banking market to reflect different technologies in the region. I also employ time 
dummies to interact with the deterministic kernel in order to capture time-varying and 
non-neutral technological progress in the banking sector. Homogeneity of degree one 
in input prices (Σγk=1) and symmetry conditions in all quadratic terms are imposed in 
model 1. 
When it comes to the estimation of the Lerner index, I extrapolate the 
marginal costs by running the following model, which is schematically the partial 
derivative of total costs with respect to total assets (see Berger et al. 2009): 
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It is then possible to construct the Lerner index (L) with respect to specific 
bank activities before delving into the analysis of competition determinants. 
According to the following structural model,  
Li,t 
Pi,t MCi,t
Pi,t   
(3) 
where P denotes the average revenue of banks estimated by total income over total 
assets and MC the marginal cost derived through model 2. Their subscripts signify the 
use of Lerner index as the only proxy of market power at the bank level over time. 
The following model 4 encompasses the conditioning of market power to various 
information sets that comprise some key effects that have been under scrutiny in the 
literature and other variables depicting conditions in the banking industry, 
institutional and macroeconomic environment. Therefore, I maintain the structure of 
four specifications in models 4 and 5 in order to draw upon the changes of 
significance in the key coefficients employed.   
L  f BANKS, INDUSTRY ,ECONOMY ,DUMMIES       (4) 
There are some econometric issues involved in this case. First, I run Hausman 
test to see whether fixed or random effects are appropriate, an amended Wald test for 
present groupwise heteroskedasticity, Wooldridge test for first degree of 
autocorrelation and the significance of using time fixed effects (testparm). I come up 
with concurrent heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation in the model urging us to opt for 
cluster robust standard errors at bank level.  
As a next step, the analysis goes further down by replacing the aforementioned 
Lerner index with indexes that are based upon specific bank activities, namely income 
on loans, other interest-bearing income, fees and commissions and other non-interest 
income. Employing other sources of bank income is impossible since they lack 
considerable amount of information. In the underlying case, the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (SUR) framework accounts for error autocorrelation within banks. In 
other words, running equation-by-equation OLS regressions would be consistent but, 
nonetheless, inefficient since all equations are interrelated through the correlation of 
the error term. It is also of interest to verify, through the Breusch-Pagan test, the 
degree of error correlation across the equations of each bank and thereby the 
imperative to employ the SUR framework.  
The following model 5 comprises the contemporaneous pricing power of 
specific bank products based upon various information sets. The latter refers to the 
key features of banking entities, the market they operate within and other effects of 
economic environment. I denote as li  the income on loans, other interest income
4
, 
fees and commissions and other non-interest income
5
: 
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For the SUR to be properly applied, the models of every income-specific 
Lerner index should have exactly the same size but different information set. 
Otherwise, the estimation falls into equation-by-equation OLS. As for the employed 
data, the selection of variables stems from the ability of the banking literature to pin 
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 Interest income stemming from the trading book, investment securities and other short-term funds. It 
excludes insurance-related income (Bankscope). 
5
 Sustainable operating income that is related to the core business of a bank, totally demarcated from 
trading, derivatives, other securities and insurance income (Bankscope).  
down a theory of the interconnection amongst them and to verify it empirically. Thus, 
the analysis picks up the factors (as well as those of the baseline model) that 
determine the highest possible explanatory power for the whole sample before it 
comes to repeat the regressions for every bank type.  I also use bootstrapping 
methodology (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010) to reduce the inference bias induced by 
group-wise heteroskedasticity along with the within-panel correlation of standard 
error across models
6
. In some cases (commercial, other banks) where standard errors 
could not be computed by bootstrapping due to limited observations, I opt to exclude 
time effects from the analysis. I winsorise all dependent variables at 5% of each 
distribution tail in order to alleviate skewness persistence.  
 
3.1. Competition determinants 
Size is introduced in the form of log of total assets as a control variable in 
order to allow for the heterogeneous European sample that is associated with either 
relative market power or scale economies. I opt to plug in the model a quadratic term 
to verify whether it is the case of non-linear relationship between size and 
competition. The analysis tests the SCP paradigm with the significance of Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (concentration), which is the sum of the squared market shares of 
all banks operating in a country. Taking into account Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), 
the effect of concentration may be different if expressed in terms of total deposits and 
loans. On the contrary to the use of aggregated information for the concentration 
proxy, the estimation of HHI stems from the sample data in order to examine how the 
endogenous synthesis of market shares may constitute an exogenous force towards 
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 The Breusch-Pagan test is always rejecting the null hypothesis of no correlated residuals. Though not 
included for space considerations, they are available upon request. 
market power. However, data from non-consolidated accounts by no means exclude 
large banks that otherwise would depict larger-than-national regions, since they 
comprise information of at least a part of banks’ operations disaggregated at national 
level.  
Market share reflects the ratio of a bank’s total assets over those of a national 
banking industry. It is also expressed in terms of total deposits and loans to specify 
the channel, through which the efficiency hypothesis may hold. However, its 
statistical significance should be interpreted in conjunction with that of efficiency and 
concentration in order to give credit to the power of alternative competition theories.  
I use the first order lag of loan impairment charges over average gross loans as a 
proxy of credit risk abstaining from the traditional non-performing loans over gross 
loans since it lacks considerable amount of observations from 2002 and onwards. 
Moreover, the former is a direct measure of loan losses as it is deducted at the end of 
the year from profits and, hence, is taken into account when it comes to price bank 
products the year after; the latter is more obscure when it comprises doubtful loans 
that may or may not end up nonperforming.  
I employ cost-to-income ratio as a direct measure of operational performance 
that may be attributed to superior management or production technologies. The RE 
hypothesis assumes that banks of higher efficiency engage in competitive pricing in 
order to grasp greater market shares and lead eventually to high market concentration. 
The degree of income diversification of bank portfolios is indicated by the proxy of 
off-balance sheet activities over total assets. It is ambiguous, however, whether the 
sign of effect is going to be positive or negative since banks willing to engage in other 
than traditional loan and deposit services may have a different strategic pricing 
contingent on the bank type, region, economic cycle, between others.  
Total equity as a percentage of total assets (capital) to account of further size 
effects on the Lerner index of other non-interest income. The intuition here is that 
banks of greater size or high capital buffers are willing to expand non-traditional 
banking. Liquidity, proxied by the amount of liquid assets over customer deposits and 
short term funding, is an important driver in the models of interest-bearing Lerner 
indexes so as to quantify the correlation of pricing conduct with the ability of banks to 
facilitate a potential bank run.  
Bank claims on the private sector over GDP proxy the elasticity of aggregate 
demand so as to verify whether the dependence on bank financing may be associated 
with benefits on the real economy or loan losses and bank instability. Apart from the 
effect of real GDP growth (cyclicality) capturing the procyclical or countercyclical 
effect of market expansion on market power, the use of the real GDP per capita and 
inflation to see whether it is the case of population (GDPPC) or price effect 
(Inflation) of the business cycle in Europe. In addition, the control for sector 
regulation by the strength of legal rights index essentially measures the efficacy of 
regulatory laws with respect to collateral and bankruptcy issues in order to safeguard 
the rights of borrowers and lenders. It takes values between 0 and 10, with higher 
scores indicating that access to credit is facilitated to expand further.  
I use dummies for the divergent specialisation of European banks, viz. 
commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and ‘other’ banks that 
incorporate any bank holding and holding companies, clearing institutions and 
custody, finance companies, group finance companies, investment and trust 
corporations, investment banks, Islamic banks, other non-banking credit institutions, 
private banking and asset management companies, real estate and mortgage banks, 
securities firms and specialised governmental credit institutions. The last dummy 
‘other’ is excluded for multicollinearity reasons. The analysis employs the Dummy 
Variable Least Squares (DVLS) version of the fixed effects modelling, using country 
dummies for Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden and UK; Netherlands are excluded to eschew multicollinearity. I add time 
dummies to allow for time fixed effects after verifying their significance each time the 
information set is altered in the regression model.  
Other effects already tested in the literature, namely regulation and 
supervision, liquidity risk, equity capital, implicit interest payments or degree of risk 
aversion turn out insignificant without affecting the regression output whatsoever. I 
end up with a parsimonious information set omitting additional bank-specific and 
institutional variables that lack sufficient statistical information during the underlying 
period.   
 
3.2. Data 
The sample encompasses features of financial statements of banks operating 
within nine developed countries of the European Union as they enjoy the most 
available data recently. Particularly, they amount to 19699 observations of 2752 
banks in Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain, Sweden and 
United Kingdom. I retrieve data of unconsolidated accounts from the Bankscope 
database, macroeconomic and other regulatory variables from the World Bank and 
Eurostat. Banks are dropped off the sample that are not capable of preserving a 
satisfactory time dimension (3 years) during the period 2002-2010. 
 I get rid of the outliers in order to come up with appropriate values of the 
Lerner index that lie in-between negative infinity and one. All the determinants of 
bank competition as a second stage of our analysis narrow down the observations to 
15219 and, even, to levels of 9503 observations. Last, the third stage substantiates the 
persistence of market power effects on income-specific Lerner indexes analysing a 
sample that fluctuates between 798 and 8798 observations.  
 
[Insert table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 displays the summary statistics of the key variables used in the 
stochastic frontier model 1 averaged by country over the period 2002-2010. It is 
evident that Germany dominates the sample enumerating more than the half of total 
observations (62.3%) while the year 2002 displays the least available information for 
all countries with a gradual escalation year by year. The sample includes fewer banks 
for Spain and relatively more banks for Italy and Austria; all the rest observations are 
close to the range of 413 to 587 banks. 
 
[Insert table 2 here] 
Table 2 summarise the key statistics of the variables employed in model 1 
with total costs over total assets ranging from 3.8 in Spain to 7.1% in France while 
banks in UK and Luxembourg bear comparably higher costs in levels up to 4.7 and 
8.2 millions of Euro, respectively. The structure of balance sheets in European 
banking is indicative after a closer look at the descriptive statistics of variables used 
in models 4 and 5 (table 3). 
[Insert table 3 here] 
4. Results 
Table 4 depicts the mean values of the Lerner index and those indexes at the 
income level per banking industry as well as the average marginal costs that used for 
the estimation of the former. What really stands out in the column of marginal cost is 
the high values of the banking sectors in United Kingdom and France at about 6.7%; 
the remainder falls in-between the range of 3.8% in Sweden to 5.4% in Luxembourg. 
When it comes to compute the Lerner index, sectors with high marginal costs are 
expected to enjoy relatively greater competitive conduct. In contrast to the almost 
perfect competition in UK, France demonstrates 21%, which is higher than others 
values in countries of higher marginal costs. However, Sweden and Denmark enjoy 
the highest monopolistic rents at levels of circa 39 and 33.3%, respectively. The 
negative sign in Spain indicates irrational behaviour of bank managers pricing 
products below marginal costs. 
Supposing that irrational behaviour takes the form of competitive market in 
the eyes of customers, the results are close to the competition efficiency scores 
estimated by Bolt and Humphrey (2010). In addition, the negative values in the last 
four columns, bank-specific indexes are supposed to constitute not a straightforward 
metric of income-specific market power but, alternatively, the relative contribution of 
each Li to the construction of the Lerner index; from a different perspective, the 
analysis provides evidence of the specific products that sufficiently ‘reimburse’ the 
marginal cost. Ideally, the overall index (L) should be the sum of the 4 sub-indexes, 
although some sources are excluded from the analysis as unavailable and, thus, the 
lack of data does not permit us to delineate rankings of relative market power at 
income level, but rather to investigate its possible effects (table 4). I should note, 
however, that the weighting of each source in the construction of a banks’ portfolio is 
calibrated as if there is nothing missing in order to highlight the distance from the 
respective level of marginal cost and intuitively the degree of portfolio specialisation 
and strategic orientation of profit-maximizing institutions. 
 
[Insert table 4 here] 
 
I run model 4 for the whole sample (table 5) along with the inclusion of 
squared asset size and the disaggregated indicators of concentration and market share 
in the deposits and loans markets regressions. The analysis also allows for type-
specific prediction of several factors on the pricing behaviour of four bank categories, 
namely commercial, cooperative, savings and ‘other’, which includes all the rest 
failing to construct a sufficient size of panel series (table 6). The necessity of doing so 
is to explain how the market power of each specialisation is formulated given the 
divergence of strategic priorities and corporate expertise.  
 
[Insert table 5 here] 
 
As table 5 indicates, there is a negative relationship between size and market 
power, particularly traced in cooperative, savings and ‘other’ banks (see table 6). 
Non-linearities are present through the quadratic term of asset size, which remains at 
the same levels significant with negative sign; positive correlation does exist at least 
up to a certain level of the asset size of savings and ‘other’ banks, reminiscent of 
contestable conduct or economies of scale that turn it negative; cooperative banks, 
however, experience a negative pattern only in lower values of total assets due to the 
homogenous German industry of equally sized institutions.  
As for market structure, there is a positive stand-alone effect of concentration 
on market power. It is nonetheless significant in the panel fixed-effects model 
(column 3), rendering the investigation of concentration on loans and deposits an 
imperative along the lines of De Guevara et al. (2005). The Cournot-type oligopoly is 
confirmed by the significantly positive coefficient of deposit-related concentration of 
savings banks, alongside collusive practices in the loans markets of both savings and 
‘other’ banks. Hence, specific bank types endorse the tendency of taking advantage of 
cost efficiency or monopolistic pricing to guarantee high profitability.  
Contrarily opposed to the relative market power hypothesis, market share 
performs insignificant and negative coefficient with a positive indication traced in 
‘other’ banks and cooperative banks. However, a more competitive pricing seems a 
common practice for commercial banks and for cooperative banks of relatively low 
market share. Efficiency structure hypothesis is verified by the negative and 
significant coefficient of cost-to-income ratio at the 1% level along the lines of 
Koetter et al. (2012), who concluded the same for US banks. In fact, the strategic 
option of banks to exploit lower costs in favour of their customers either in the form 
of lower loan rates or higher deposit rates (Vennet, 2002). Furthermore, credit risk 
motivates commercial and cooperative banks to apply higher profit margins, a 
strategy which is contradistinction with that of ‘other’ banks. In cases where the 
element of increased market share is not verified empirically as it is assumed by the 
theory, banks with lower costs have relatively higher margins along the lines of pure 
efficiency hypothesis.  
Credit risk as proxied by loan impairment charges over average gross loans 
motivates commercial and cooperative banks to apply higher profit margins, contrary 
to what ‘other’ banks appear to do. It bears negligible effect in the FE model as 
indicated by its opposite coefficient and statistical insignificance, though the omission 
of it causes almost a 3% loss of explanatory power. That is attributable to the total 
absorption of bank specificities in the panel FE model, since our heterogeneous 
sample may blur the trend of banks with different specialisation. Furthermore, 
portfolio diversification proclaimed by the use of off-balance sheet activities over 
total assets demonstrates a stable positive pattern with a level of significance up to 1% 
level. Thus, banks are willing to impose greater prices on products if their portfolios 
are well diversified against potential market and credit risks; however, that may come 
at the expense of bank solvency if coupled by potential diseconomies of scope. 
The effect of GDP growth remains insignificant in all but one specification, 
while its positive sign implies procyclical force for savings banks rather than the 
opposing countercyclical practice of commercial banks. Thus in times of economic 
expansion, the former enjoys relatively higher margins exacerbating thereby the 
economic conditions down the road either seconding bubbles or deepening the 
recession spiral. However, the significance is not robust and, thus, any remark should 
be drawn with caution. Moreover, the elasticity of aggregate demand, which is a 
bank-oriented form of firm financing, is significant up to 1% level in the aggregate as 
well as in the case of commercial and cooperative banks. The negative effect means 
that as more credit is demanded and granted to the private sector, banks tend to 
narrow down profit margins.  
After accounting of all fixed effects in European banking, the negative effect 
of lending-facilitating laws is considerably significant on market power and in 
particular for cooperative and commercial banking. Regulatory and supervisory 
policies are expressed in the degree of law stringency acting preventively against 
monopolistic practices and in favour of borrowers and lenders in order to facilitate 
access to credit.  
 
[Insert table 6 here] 
 
Up next, I apply seemingly unrelated regressions of income-specific Lerner 
indexes on key features of market structure and power (Herfindahl index, asset size, 
marker share) along with the quadratic term and disaggregated variables on bank 
deposits and loans. There is also need for different information set for each index 
since otherwise the methodology would fall into equation-by-equation OLS. The 
dependent variables are Lerner on loans (L1), other interest income (L2), fees (L3) and 
other non-interest income (L4). In particular, I include the following new variables 
most akin to the previous factors employed: 
L1 = f (size, CONC, market share, cost-to-income ratio, loan losses, liquidity) + ε1 
L2 = f (size, CONC, market share, liquidity, GDPPC, legal strength) + ε2 
L3 = f (size, CONC, market share, diversification, private credit, inflation) + ε3 
L4 = f (size, CONC, market share, diversification, equity, private credit) + ε4 
Table 7 exhibits the lowest fit of the 830 observations, as R-squared ranges 
between 62.7% and 68.4%. The fact that banks specialized in lending/deposit-taking 
enjoy higher margins due to long-lasting relationships may justify the low explanatory 
power of the commercial modeling (Petersen and Rajan, 1995; Berlin and Mester, 
1999). Furthermore, asset size seems to be highly significant for L-otherint and L-
othernint models with a negative bearing while it turns negative for L-loans. In other 
words, as banks increase their size, prices on other interest and non-interest products 
(loans) are plummeting (increasing). Non-linearities exist in all cases but L-otherint; 
as banks are getting bigger in asset size they tend to offer lower other interest and 
non-interest profit margins and higher loan rates. After a certain point, higher bank 
size goes the other way around making banks follow the exactly opposite trend.  
 
[Insert table 7 here] 
Moreover, insignificant correlation between concentrated structures in loans 
(deposits) with all Lerner indexes (L-loans) fails to corroborate the studies of 
Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) and Angelini and Cetorelli (2003). The significant and 
positive effect of aggregate concentration on the Lerner index of fees partly shows the 
ability of European member states to exploit concentrated markets in order to boost 
their performance. Besides, the market share is negatively correlated with 
monopolistic pricing in the L-fees case; however, when it comes to their 
disaggregated constituents, banks tend to decrease (increase) prices on loans as their 
market share in the deposits (loans) markets is getting higher. Such evidence, coupled 
with relative efficiency gains (significant TC/TI), is indicative of the ‘cream 
skimming’ hypothesis, which assumes that the process of integration force foreigners 
to pick up banks of higher operational efficiency to grasp higher market shares 
monopolising loan markets. Accounting of the negative coefficient of market share in 
deposits, it gives more credit to the competitive conduct of banks in the deposit 
market so as to attract new customers. It is also interesting that the pattern of market 
share in the loan markets is opposite between traditional (loans) and off-balance sheet 
activities (othernint) possibly on account of risk sharing or hedging. These results are 
perhaps reminiscent of the hold-up problem of relationship banking, namely the 
ability of banks with monopoly power and proprietary information to charge higher 
loan rates on customers. 
Loan losses have a significant and negative impact on L-loans, implying that 
banks may tend to react by imposing lower loan prices and holding other risk-free 
investments in order to rationalize their loan books. Commercial banks with high 
share of liquid assets are willing to impose lower prices on loans, a pattern which is 
not accepted ex ante. In fact, banks may consider liquid assets as a safety net for 
potential losses and have no need for excessive risk-taking. In times of economic 
booms when inflation pressures are considerable, commercial banks lessen their fees 
and commissions in an attempt to boost the volume of transactions. In addition, legal 
framework that protects both borrowers and lenders enhances competition in other 
interest products.  
In table 8, cooperative banks enumerate 6331 observations with a R-squared 
ranging from 64.5% in L-otherint to 89.4% in L-fees; the rest are up to levels of 
77.9% and 77.5% for L-loans and L-othernint, respectively. The natural logarithm of 
total assets is negatively associated with all cases but L-fees at 1% level of 
significance while there exists non-linear relationship in the models of L-loans and L-
fees. It is positive up to a certain level of assets when it turns negative at higher levels 
of scale economies. However, the trend in L-othernint is exactly the opposite, 
according to which the negative bearing switches to positive. 
SCP paradigm is rejected on the grounds of insignificant effect of aggregate 
concentration on the price of any income source. I nonetheless observe negative 
association of concentration in the deposit market with L-loans. The positive sign in 
the loans markets, as Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) argued also about, instantiates the 
passing-through mechanism of causality in the specific case of cooperative banks. 
[Insert table 8 here] 
In addition, banks with greater market share behave competitively when they 
impose prices on other interest income, fees and commissions. Relative market power 
is scantily existent in the L-loans model having a negative (positive) bearing in the 
deposit (loan) market. It is also the case of efficient structure hypothesis for L-loans 
as the pertinent coefficient is negative at 1% level of significance with considerable 
credit losses making also banks reluctant to succumb to high prices on loans. 
According to it, amid competitive conditions in the market more efficient banks are 
likely to survive by means of eliciting greater market share from less efficient 
institutions (Demsetz, 1973).  
The share of OBS to total assets has a considerably positive impact on L-fees 
and L-otherint corroborating the tendency of well-diversified banks to impose high 
margins. Bank capital demonstrates, as expected, a positive sign suggesting that a 
higher degree of risk aversion (high capital ratio) is transmuted to higher margin on 
OBS activities to make up for the inherent systematic risk
7
. What is more, the degree 
of liquidity of bank assets turns out to have a negative effect on L-otherint, as 
opposed to the case of more liquid commercial banks that prefer lower prices on 
loans.  
Private credit is also an important factor for L-fees with a negative sign 
without losing significance when there is disaggregation of concentration and market 
share or the non-linear term of asset size. Moreover, the indication that the price 
effect of economic growth as well as proactive legal initiatives in favour of consumer 
                                                        
7
 Alternatively, it may constitute a signal in the market of creditworthiness, but since the sample 
comprises only developed economies with strong legal environment, there need to be high capital 
buffers in order to restore depositor confidence (Claeys and Vennet, 2008).  
protection operates procyclically towards monopolistic practices in fee and other 
interest income, respectively.  
[Insert table 9 here] 
 
Next, the regression output for savings banks (table 9) based upon 3390 
observations in each model. The fit here is between 60.5% (L-otherint) and 95.4% (L-
fees) while the rest settles at about 78%. Asset size does have a positive effect on L-
othernint and a negative one on L-fees. Non-linearities are traced in the L-loans 
following a negative trend as soon as it turns negative in higher scale economies. In 
contrast, L-fees and L-otherint models report a positive-to-negative nexus, although 
the latter comes with 10% significance level. Concentration in EU member states has 
only a positive effect in the aggregate on L-otherint followed by the market share with 
the same pattern, as well.  
Cost efficiency along with credit risk is negatively interconnected with L-
loans at 1% level compatible with the practice of banks to exercise market power on 
the grounds of reducing costs. Thus, there is no indication of ‘quit life’ hypothesis, 
according to which banks not vulnerable to intense competition, managers by no 
means seek to maximise profits through an everlasting cost reduction (Berger and 
Hannan, 1998; Delis and Tsionas, 2009). Rather pure efficiency hypothesis comes 
into play, which sets out the ability of efficient banks to engage in monopolistic 
pricing without intending to higher market shares. In addition, diversified portfolios 
make banks feel safer to charge higher margins on OBS activities offsetting at least in 
part the positive effect of loan losses on competitive pricing of loans. 
Moreover, banks with high share of liquid assets engage in competitive 
pricing on loans and monopolistic conduct on other interest-bearing activities; 
however, that is in contrast with the pattern observed in cooperative banks. As 
cooperative banks operate in a decentralised system of rather national as well as 
regional outreach, liquid assets enable banks to enhance long-standing relationships 
through cheaper loans and more expensive prices on trading and investment 
securities. That may also be conducive from the opportunity cost that banks are bound 
to bear as a result of their obligation to withhold liquid reserves. Thus, higher loan 
prices compensates for potentially higher interest rates being available in the financial 
markets (Hawtrey and Liand, 2008). It is intuitively relevant the argument of 
Lakonishok et al (1992), according to which larger banks with low liquid assets share 
demonstrate a herding behaviour in excessive risk-taking in other (interest) income 
sources by charging higher profit margins.  
More private credit and legal stringency are persistently significant and 
negatively related to L-othernint and L-otherint, respectively. As inflation and GDP 
per capita are insignificant I conclude that there pricing conduct is not contingent on 
different stages of economic development. 
The remaining banking sector (table 10) constitutes a heterogeneous group of 
different financial institutions. In table 10, the results are produced out of 396 
observations concluding to moderate R-squared values ranging from 66.1% in L-
othernint to 74.7% in L-loans model; the 31.4% fit in L-fees model is the half of that 
in the first specification of no disaggregation and non-linear term. That may be 
attributed to the more terms that exacerbate the degree of multicollinearity.  
As for asset size, it takes a positive coefficient at 1% significance level for L-
otherint and negative for L-loans, L-fees and L-otherint. Besides, non-linear 
relationship between size and competition is evident in the first three models, in 
which savings banks seem to charge higher (lower) prices on loans and fees (other 
interest-bearing products) but further down the road they reap the benefits of scale 
economies to reverse their strategy. 
 
[Insert table 10 here] 
In the model of L-loan, some sort of contestability justifies the negative sign 
of concentration in the deposits markets at 5% level of significance. On the other 
hand, collusion in the deposit market motivates incumbent banks to monopolise the 
market through higher margins on other interest income. Furthermore, banks tend to 
exploit their relative market power by imposing higher prices on other interest-
bearing products and fees, and lower margins on loans and other non-interest 
activities. That is further decomposed into a negative bearing of market share in 
deposits markets on L-loans as well as positive (negative) effect of it in the deposits 
(loans) market.  
Cost efficiency persistently contains a negative effect on L-loans 
corroborating the results of Maudos and De Guevara (2007) diversification in bank 
portfolios and demand elasticity positively affect L-othernint and L-fees, respectively. 
Legal stringency maintains its preemptive repercussion against market monopoly. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The advent of Euro and the concomitant formulation of a single market 
brought about considerable challenges and opportunities for the whole banking 
industry. The analysis of the market power in 9 developed markets suggests imperfect 
competition but not at levels that signify collusive tendency. However, the markets of 
Denmark and Sweden seem to experience more than 33% of price mark-up over 
marginal cost whereas Spain lies in the other extremum with negative Lerner index 
highlighting potential predatory pricing or irrational pricing conduct since cost-raising 
strategy is not illustrated by high marginal costs.  
I then attempt to explain competition in terms of which are the significant 
drivers conducive to it. In particular, monopolistic pricing appears a common practice 
in small-sized savings and ‘other’ financial institutions as far as their increased size 
makes them act competitively. In contrast, cooperative banks tend to impose low 
prices in an attempt for high market shares albeit at greater levels the same positive 
pattern holds. I take account of non-linearities, if any, between asset size and market 
power and provide evidence that different bank types tend to behave asymmetrically 
along the pace of increasing assets. Indeed, monopolistic pricing on other non-interest 
bearing products comes along in savings banks and ‘other’ banks of higher size while 
banks turn out to impose high prices on loans (except savings banks), fees (except 
commercial banks); other interest income activities are highly charged by savings 
banks of limited asset class. Our analysis, therefore, gives insight to the contribution 
of size on pricing conduct and its role in upcoming bank failures. 
I endorse also the necessity for antitrust policies that stand up against collusive 
practices of concentrated markets, as savings (commercial) banks implement higher 
other interest income (fees). With concentrated loans markets, market power is also 
evident in ‘other’ and commercial banks while the same holds for the latter in 
deposits markets. Even so, cooperative (‘other’) banks enjoy higher profit margins on 
loans (other interest products) if the loans (deposits) market is considerably 
concentrated. Likewise, banks with high market shares tend to behave competitively 
opposing to the operation of ‘other’ banks, which appear to entertain higher fees due 
to their high market share in the deposits market. Hence, insignificance (except for 
‘other’ banks) of the relative market power hypothesis suggests that policy makers 
should take account of certain banks enjoying high margins in specific product 
categories amid collusive practices across either loans or deposits markets.  
In addition, the efficient operation turns out significant in European banking 
as low costs induce banks to charge lower interest rates on loans or higher deposit 
rates. However, that gives no credit to the inherent impetus of banks for higher market 
shares in order to exploit their power, with the exception of ‘other’ banks and in high 
levels of market share of cooperative banks. In contrast, commercial, cooperative with 
higher market shares impose low fees, while cooperative and savings banks utilise 
low other interest charges. Cost economies, therefore, constitute an indispensable 
catalyst of convergence towards competitive prices while incentives in favour of 
income diversification induce banks (cooperative, commercial, ‘other) for higher fees 
and others (cooperative, commercial) for high other non-interest rates.  
More capitalised banks (cooperative, savings) also tend to surrender to high 
prices of other non-interest bearing activities, an issue which is directly linked to 
capital requirements given that they constitute a considerable part of a bank’s 
portfolio. Furthermore, I signify the extension of Basel III in incorporating liquidity 
requirements towards stable institutions that provide liquidity to market participants 
effectively and manage payment transactions across different regions. Along the lines, 
more liquid cooperative (commercial) banks offer other interest products (cheap 
loans) at low prices although savings banks tend also to counterbalance the 
opportunity cost of liquid assets through higher non-interest rates.  
Moreover, the need of additional requirements on a countercyclical basis 
exists only for savings given that commercial banks react contrarily to the business 
cycle. The latter, however, may imply poor monitoring and screening practices as 
well as (limited) securitisation of low ‘quality’. In addition, in economies of high 
GDP per capita and inflation cooperative banks tend to charge higher other interest 
prices to make up for possible losses on fixed loan rates. Hence, there is room for 
further institutional reforming especially in the cases of ‘other’ banks, which seem to 
exploit higher elasticity of aggregate demand and impose higher fees.
  
 
 
 
Table 1: Number of banks 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Austria  27 125 143 147 155 159 146 133 106 1141 
Denmark 11 44 47 47 50 50 62 61 56 428 
France 25 62 65 75 74 75 66 62 53 557 
Germany 326 1328 1346 1619 1625 1609 1565 1515 1344 12277 
Italy 18 19 22 572 581 595 582 555 406 3350 
  Luxembourg 27 50 54 52 51 55 53 44 27 413 
Spain 8 9 15 68 69 52 56 61 48 386 
Sweden 25 75 73 77 71 69 58 56 56 560 
UK 14 50 61 71 76 82 83 81 69 587 
Total 481 1762 1826 2728 2752 2746 2671 2568 2165 19699 
Source: Own estimations of data retrieved from Bankscope. 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics of variables in model 1 
Country 
TOTAL 
COSTS 
TOTAL 
ASSETS  
PERS 
EXP 
OTHER 
OPER 
EXP 
FIXED 
ASSETS 
OBS EQUITY 
Austria  0.045 842.83 0.013 0.011 0.017 0.014 0.087 
Denmark 0.053 625.65 0.019 0.016 0.012 0.018 0.140 
France 0.071 2182.14 0.016 0.020 0.014 0.028 0.112 
Germany 0.049 1443.27 0.015 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.068 
Italy 0.044 1519.12 0.015 0.013 0.016 0.012 0.117 
Luxembourg 0.052 4757.09 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.030 0.104 
Spain 0.038 1345.14 0.011 0.009 0.017 0.009 0.117 
Sweden 0.044 240.82 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.016 0.141 
UK 0.062 8273.54 0.018 0.023 0.011 0.032 0.155 
Average 0.049 1661.42 0.015 0.012 0.015 0.013 0.087 
All figures are expressed as a percentage of total assets apart from total assets being in millions of Euro. 
Source: Bankscope database. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Variables of models 4 and 5 
The estimation of CONC and market share along with their constituents takes account of the available information in 
Bankscope database, which enumerates up to 19761 observations of our sample. Source: World Bank, Eurostat and own 
estimations. 
 
 
Table 4: Marginal costs and Lerner indexes  
Country MC L L1 L2 L3 L4 
Austria  0.049 0.103 
-4.107  
(16.2%) 
-0.488 
(68.8%) 
-16.312 
(12.6%) 
-90.441 
(2.4%) 
Denmark 0.048 0.332 
-0.953 
(60.4%) 
-2.470 
(21.3%) 
-5.389 
(14.4%) 
-190.856 
(3.9%) 
France 0.068 0.210 
-2.179 
(47.4%) 
-15.724 
(27.8%) 
-18.621 
(18.1%) 
-90.447 
(6.7%) 
Germany 0.052 0.118 
-0.604 
(66.4%) 
-12.776 
(18.2%) 
-8.513 
(12.3%) 
-44.055 
(3.1%) 
Italy 0.049 0.126 
-2.561 
(70.3%) 
-11.748 
(15.9%) 
-8.082 
(10.9%) 
-37.187 
(2.9%) 
Luxembourg 0.054 0.215 
-3.081 
(69.6%) 
-77.182 
(12.8%) 
-5.010 
(13.3%) 
-72.152 
(4.3%) 
Spain 0.050 -0.010 
-0.846 
(2.1%) 
-9.623 
(61.5%) 
-18.705 
(35.4%) 
-120.919 
(1%) 
Sweden 0.038 0.390 
-1.061 
(71.5%) 
-21.066 
(9.8%) 
-3.650 
(17.1%) 
-89.223 
(1.6%) 
UK 0.066 0.003 
-4.307 
(7.7%) 
-32.977 
(41.7%) 
-16.982 
(47.1%) 
-81.170 
(3.5%) 
Average 0.051 0.129 -1.062 -13.526 -9.255 -53.557 
MC=Marginal Cost; L=Lerner index; L1=Lerner with respect to income on loans; L2=Lerner index 
with respect to other interest income; L3=Lerner index with respect to fees and commissions; 
L4=Lerner index with respect to other non-interest income. All estimates are expressed in average 
terms per industry sector with the last row estimating the averages of the 9-country sample. The 
percentage in the parentheses highlights the weights of income sources on banks’ portfolio. 
 
Variable AUS DEN FRA GER IT LUX SP SWED UK 
CONC 0.071 0.133 0.059 0.013 0.107 0.123 0.150 0.040 0.273 
CONC (deposits) 0.073 0.075 0.062 0.010 0.113 0.127 0.155 0.040 0.373 
CONC (loans) 0.071 0.142 0.053 0.011 0.136 0.126 0.127 0.048 0.424 
Market share 0.008 0.021 0.016 0.001 0.003 0.022 0.023 0.016 0.015 
Market share (deposits) 0.008 0.021 0.016 0.001 0.003 0.022 0.023 0.016 0.016 
Market share (loans)  0.008 0.021 0.016 0.001 0.003 0.023 0.023 0.016 0.017 
TC/TI 0.669 0.679 0.665 0.708 0.691 0.586 0.628 0.642 0.800 
Loan impairment 0.893 1.204 -2.821 2.173 0.675 0.807 1.912 0.604 1.430 
OBS/TA 0.014 0.018 0.028 0.011 0.012 0.030 0.009 0.016 0.032 
EQ/TA 0.087 0.140 0.112 0.068 0.117 0.104 0.117 0.141 0.155 
Liquidity 0.306 0.245 0.273 0.188 0.273 0.831 0.296 0.166 0.653 
GDPGR 0.017 0.006 0.011 0.009 0.002 0.028 0.019 0.022 0.016 
Private credit 1.147 1.878 0.996 1.116 0.970 1.486 1.633 1.167 1.754 
GDPPC 30367  37989 27322 27789 24367 65344 20900 33044 30289 
Ιnflation 1.811 1.944 1.867 1.600 2.222 2.689 2.833 1.811 2.200 
Legal Strength 7.000 8.714 6.000 7.571 3.000 6.800 6.000 6.714 10.000 
Table 5: Regression output (whole sample) 
Competition 
Determinants 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
LnQ 
-0.0148*** -0.0112*** -0.0367*** 0.0149* 0.0337*** 0.0577 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.038) 
(LnQ)^2 - - - 
-0.0024*** -0.0037*** -0.0072** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Concentration 
0.1399 0.1504 0.2784*** 
- - - 
(0.101) (0.119) (0.101) 
Concentration 
(deposits) 
- - - 
0.1852* 0.2347** 0.2653*** 
(0.098) (0.106) (0.081) 
Concentration (loans) - - - 
0.1630*** 0.1604*** 0.0530 
(0.050) (0.054) (0.048) 
Market share 
-0.5458 -0.7222 0.0857 
- - - 
(0.344) (0.448) (0.770) 
Market share (deposits) - - - 
-0.5367 -0.1282 1.0430 
(0.413) (0.527) (0.662) 
Market share (loans) - - - 
0.1381 -0.2285 -0.6136 
(0.399) (0.601) (0.547) 
Cost/TI 
-0.5834*** -0.5738*** -0.5795*** -0.5821*** -0.5734*** -0.5722*** 
(0.034) (0.046) (0.066) (0.034) (0.046) (0.065) 
Loan impairment  
0.0103*** 0.0088* -0.0081 0.0107*** 0.0092* -0.0082 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) 
OBS/TA 
0.7486*** 0.7920*** 0.3526** 0.7433*** 0.7818*** 0.3682** 
(0.181) (0.180) (0.142) (0.180) (0.178) (0.154) 
GDPGR 
0.0164 0.0757 0.1038*** 0.0489 0.1253 0.0874*** 
(0.149) (0.198) (0.017) (0.147) (0.193) (0.017) 
Private credit 
-0.0582** -0.0330 -0.0106 -0.0979*** -0.1058*** -0.0433** 
(0.028) (0.037) (0.019) (0.026) (0.034) (0.021) 
Legal strength 
-0.0071** -0.0075* -0.0098*** -0.0047* -0.0026 -0.0087*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) 
Specialisation dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Intercept 
0.5166*** 0.4372*** 0.8223*** 0.4701*** 0.3971*** 0.5511*** 
(0.051) (0.061) (0.055) (0.052) (0.062) (0.126) 
R-squared 0.750 0.770 0.901 0.753 0.776 0.901 
Obs 15219 15219 15219 15216 15216 15216 
Column (1): standard OLS regression with standard errors clustered at the bank level using country and time 
fixed effects to allow for unobserved heterogeneity; Column (2): Fixed effects model estimation with clustered 
standard error at the bank level along with probability country weights. In so doing, I apply the inverse of the 
number of banks operating within a national banking sector for cases where sample is overrepresented by some 
countries (e.g. Germany); Column (3): Fixed effects model estimation with clustered standard error at the bank 
level with time fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses while asterisks ***, **, * denote the 
significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
8
.    
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  We drop the dummies of 2002 and Spain for multicollinearity reasons. 
Table 6: Regression output per bank type 
Competition Determinants 
MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Commercial Cooperative Savings Other 
LnQ 
-0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0171*** -0.0163** -0.0089*** 0.0423** -0.0390*** 0.1419*** 
(0.006) (0.038) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.017) (0.009) (0.035) 
(LnQ)^2 - 
-0.0001 
- 
-0.0001 
- 
-0.0036*** 
- 
-0.0124*** 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Concentration 
0.0799 
- 
0.0272 
- 
-0.3895* 
- 
0.0937 
- 
(0.176) (0.056) (0.215) (0.293) 
Concentration (deposits) - 
0.2490* 
- 
-0.7215 
- 
-0.0990 
- 
0.1804 
(0.130) (0.520) (0.432) -0.217 
Concentration (loans) - 
0.1374** 
- 
0.7243 
- 
-0.1395 
- 
0.2707* 
(0.066) (0.504) (0.398) (0.153) 
Market share 
-1.2176*** 
- 
-1.3911*** 
- 
0.6267 
- 
1.0301* 
- 
(0.417) (0.265) (0.404) (0.556) 
Market share (deposits) - 
-1.2171 
- 
-3.2271*** 
- 
0.5640 
- 
0.8079 
(0.738) (0.670) (0.831) (1.193) 
Market share (loans) - 
0.3098 
- 
1.8082*** 
- 
-0.3401 
- 
0.7306 
(0.796) (0.566) (0.570) (0.689) 
Cost/TI 
-0.5112*** -0.5075*** -0.6216*** -0.6218*** -0.6448*** -0.6356*** -0.6431*** -0.6362*** 
(0.072) (0.073) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.028) 
Loan impairment  
0.0197*** 0.0197*** 0.4730*** 0.4812*** 0.2974 0.2949 -0.0096* -0.0093 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.128) (0.123) (0.223) (0.219) (0.006) (0.006) 
OBS/TA 
0.6101*** 0.6031*** 3.7762*** 3.7687*** 5.1893*** 4.8759*** 0.6541** 0.7350*** 
(0.191) (0.198) (0.517) (0.519) (1.071) (1.026) (0.269) (0.260) 
GDPGR 
-1.2818*** -1.2030** 0.0814 0.1429 0.4602** 0.4771*** 0.5598 0.6401 
(0.465) (0.467) (0.098) (0.113) (0.184) (0.180) (0.549) (0.546) 
Private credit 
-0.2033*** -0.2502*** -0.0981*** -0.1060*** -0.0394 -0.0464 0.2093 -0.0132 
(0.056) (0.053) (0.020) (0.022) (0.035) (0.035) (0.130) (0.154) 
Legal strength 
-0.0053 -0.0013 -0.0124*** -0.0104*** -0.0007 -0.0025 -0.0149 -0.0052 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.011) 
Country effects YES 
Time effects YES 
Intercept 
0.7863*** 
(0.123) 
0.8063*** 0.7156*** 
(0.035) 
0.7085*** 
(0.037) 
0.4751*** 0.3196*** 0.3334 
(0.274) 
-0.0161 
(0.309) (0.178) (0.071) (0.089) 
R-squared 
Obs 
0.656 0.655 0.833 0.834 0.870 0.875 0.796 0.809 
1612 1611 8798 8798 4009 4009 800 798 
OLS regressions for every single productive specialisation of banks (commercial, cooperative, savings, other) with clustered standard errors at the bank level utilising 
country and time fixed effects to allow for unobserved heterogeneity. The second column per bank type is the expansion of the information set to comprise the quadratic 
term of asset size as well as the concentration and market share with respect to deposits and loans markets. Standard errors are in parentheses while asterisks ***, **, * 
denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
9
. 
 
 
 
                                                        
9
 We drop the dummies of 2002 and Spain for multicollinearity reasons. 
Table 7: SUR for commercial banks 
Commercial  L-loans L-otherint L-fees L-othernint L-loans L-otherint L-fees L-othernint 
lnQ 
0.034*** -0.716** -0.021 -3.629** 0.340*** -2.127 -2.515** -32.562*** 
2.84 -2.16 -0.09 -2.15 5.00 -1.27 -1.98 -3.60 
(LnQ)^2 - 
-0.022*** 0.103 0.175** 2.044*** 
-4.73 0.84 2.20 3.36 
Concentration 
-1.395 2.978 15.554** 98.523 
- 
1.57 0.19 2.20 0.94 
Concentration (deposits) - 
-1.484 2.375 10.059 78.132 
-1.38 0.10 0.86 0.71 
Concentration (loans) - 
-0.691 7.454 4.973 -22.432 
-1.42 0.60 0.57 -0.31 
Market share 
-0.917 28.477 -19.847** 50.969 
- 
-1.01 0.93 -1.99 0.54 
Market share (deposits) - 
-4.316*** 78.435 -24.921 230.891 
-3.14 1.62 -1.56 1.40 
Market share (loans) - 
5.635*** -65.045 -2.822 -308.762** 
4.69 -1.56 -0.19 -2.21 
Cost/TI 
-0.480*** 
- - - 
-0.416*** 
- - - 
-3.65 -3.36 
Loan impairment  
-0.064*** 
- - - 
-0.052*** 
- - - 
-4.37 -3.88 
OBS/TA - - 
14.791 104.071 
- - 
13.811 93.689 
0.53 0.59 0.51 0.60 
EQ/TA - - - 
14.561 
- - - 
10.694 
0.75 0.55 
Liquidity 
-0.157*** -0.118 
- - 
-0.124** -0.510 
- - 
-2.76 -0.13 -2.28 -0.52 
GDPPC - 
1.673 
-  - 
2.032 
- - 
0.15 0.18 
Private credit - - 
1.017 9.263 
- - 
0.106 13.017 
0.66 0.46 0.06 0.61 
Inflation - - 
-46.226*** 
- - - 
-51.325*** 
- 
-2.83 -3.10 
Legal strength - 
-1.036** 
- - - 
-1.038** 
- - 
-2.38 -2.38 
Country effects YES YES 
Time effects NO NO 
R-squared 0.660 0.656 0.627 0.645 0.684 0.659 0.632 0.653 
Obs 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 830 
The table summarizes the results of commercial banks through two Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, the first one including total assets, market share and concentration apart 
from other controls and country fixed effects and the other analyzing the effect of total assets squared, concentration and market share with respect to deposits and loans. I opt 
to exclude time fixed effects since otherwise standard errors could not be estimated. The estimation allows for correlation among errors across the four models within each bank 
as well as heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrapping. The four models have as independent variables Lerner indexes specific to four distinctive sources of bank income: 
Loans, other interest income, fees/commissions and other non-interest income. T-statistic is reported below each coefficient while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance 
level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.    
Table 8: SUR for cooperative banks 
Cooperative L-loans L-otherint L-fees L-othernint L-loans L-otherint L-fees L-othernint 
lnQ 
-0.019*** -0.353*** 0.399*** -3.747*** 0.053** -0.574 5.001*** -11.900*** 
-5.24 -4.30 10.87 -15.89 2.49 -1.12 16.13 -8.23 
(LnQ)^2 - 
-0.006*** 0.018 -0.396*** 0.700*** 
-3.67 0.34 -16.69 4.63 
Concentration 
0.585 -3.215 0.355 16.908 
- 
1.62 -0.54 0.07 0.84 
Concentration (deposits) - 
-13.175*** 80.076 -33.922 -822.439 
-3.03 0.34 -0.20 -0.68 
Concentration (loans) - 
13.854*** -83.087 37.683 818.669 
3.02 -0.35 0.23 0.66 
Market share 
0.947 -113.862*** -59.845*** 44.741 
- 
1.29 -3.87 -4.41 0.30 
Market share (deposits) - 
-26.258*** 140.772 47.742 154.660 
-4.94 1.50 1.17 0.62 
Market share (loans) - 
23.452*** -224.168*** -21.603*** -212.271 
3.03 -4.11 -5.31 -1.37 
Cost/TI 
-1.087*** 
- - - 
-1.095*** 
- - - 
-21.93 -41.96 
Loan impairment  
-4.427*** 
- - - 
-4.612*** 
- - - 
-8.47 -5.05 
OBS/TA - - 
294.011*** 2166.794*** 
- - 
271.227*** 2215.934*** 
9.26 13.26 9.16 32.33 
EQ/TA - - - 
115.077*** 
- - - 
116.478*** 
5.08 59.67 
Liquidity 
0.007 -3.048*** 
- - 
0.047 -3.263*** 
- - 
0.24 -3.88 1.26 -4.62 
GDPPC - 
12.327 
-  - 
16.067*** 
- - 
1.11 8.65 
Private credit - - 
-5.097*** 8.358 
- - 
-6.281* 9.174 
-3.17 0.79 -1.93 0.30 
Inflation - - 
66.989* 
- - - 
34.653 
- 
1.82 0.95 
Legal strength - 
1.000 
- - - 
1.000 
- - 
1.16 1.16 
Country effects YES YES 
Time effects NO NO 
R-squared 0.776 0.645 0.886 0.754 0.779 0.646 0.894 0.755 
Obs 6331 6331 6331 6331 6331 6331 6331 6331 
The table summarises the results of cooperative banks through two Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, the first one including total assets, market share and concentration apart 
from other controls and country/time fixed effects and the other analysing the effect of total assets squared, concentration and market share with respect to deposits and loans. 
The estimation allows for correlation among errors across the four models within each bank as well as heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrapping. The four models have as 
independent variables Lerner indexes specific to four distinctive sources of bank income: Loans, other interest income, fees/commissions and other non-interest income. T-
statistic is reported below each coefficient while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.    
 
Table 9: SUR for savings banks 
Savings L-loans L-otherint L-fees L-othernint L-loans L-otherint L-fees L-othernint 
LnQ 
-0.005 0.185 -0.125*** 6.242*** -0.044*** 2.393* 2.216*** 6.305* 
-1.28 1.12 -3.21 9.67 -3.01 1.66 6.03 1.70 
(LnQ)^2 - 
0.003*** -0.159* -0.162*** 0.012 
3.34 -1.89 -7.36 0.04 
Concentration 
-1.17 61.661** -11.216 -185.585 
- 
-1.06 1.99 -1.32 -0.88 
Concentration (deposits) - 
-3.643 51.943 -35.470 -1041.498 
-1.03 0.24 -0.56 -1.34 
Concentration (loans) - 
-0.268 138.899 31.849 689.327 
-0.10 1.62 0.58 0.92 
Market share 
0.176 -108.646*** 5.136 -377.764 
- 
0.57 -3.87 0.52 -1.25 
Market share (deposits) - 
-7.610 305.896 -21.090 -959.774 
-1.15 0.73 -0.53 -0.73 
Market share (loans) - 
7.438 -385.343 6.085 500.170 
0.87 -0.73 0.15 0.31 
Cost/TI 
-1.032*** 
- - - 
-1.032*** 
- - - 
-28.73 -34.39 
Loan impairment  
-10.857*** 
- - - 
-10.820*** 
- - - 
-21.10 -22.35 
OBS/TA - - 
415.473*** 4333.502*** 
- - 
407.844*** 4474.753*** 
14.21 16.03 10.72 5.60 
EQ/TA - -  
74.371** 
- - - 
67.813* 
2.10 1.68 
Liquidity 
-0.321*** 11.551*** 
- - 
-0.304*** 10.803*** 
- - 
-6.79 19.91 -4.56 3.62 
GDPPC - 
22.278 
- - - 
37.148 
- - 
0.83 1.63 
Private credit - - 
-0.727 -103.363*** 
- - 
-2.108 -104.621*** 
-0.56 -7.62 -1.29 -8.14 
Inflation - - 
8.931 
- - - 
2.253 
- 
0.30 0.06 
Legal strength - 
-0.990*** 
- - - 
-1.015*** 
- - 
-2.65 -3.03 
Country effects YES YES 
Time effects NO NO 
R-squared 0.778 0.605 0.953 0.777 0.780 0.610 0.954 0.779 
Obs 3390 3390 3390 3390 3390 3390 3390 3390 
The table summarises the results of savings banks through two Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, the first one including total assets, market share and concentration apart 
from other controls and country/time fixed effects and the other analysing the effect of total assets squared, concentration and market share with respect to deposits and 
loans. The estimation allows for correlation among errors across the four models within each bank as well as heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrapping. The four 
models have as independent variables Lerner indexes specific to four distinctive sources of bank income: Loans, other interest income, fees/commissions and other non-
interest income. The information sets of the models are equally sized but not equivalent whatsoever; otherwise I would fall into the standard case of equation-by-equation 
OLS. T-statistic is reported below each coefficient while asterisks ***, **, * denote the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 10: SUR for ‘other’ banks 
Other L-loans L-otherint L-fees L-othernint L-loans L-otherint L-fees L-othernint 
LnQ 
-0.051*** 0.651* -1.224*** -8.790*** 0.231*** -4.753** 3.736*** -0.196 
3.24 1.88 -5.02 -6.12 2.79 -2.38 3.19 -0.02 
(LnQ)^2 - 
-0.014** 0.389*** -0.324*** -0.626 
-2.41 2.99 -4.29 -1.14 
Concentration 
-0.635 17.604 16.706 78.663 
- 
-0.58 0.92 0.72 0.36 
Concentration (deposits) - 
-1.670** 38.086** -0.174 81.991 
-2.27 1.97 -0.01 0.45 
Concentration (loans) - 
-0.279 -9.189 10.526 92.924 
-0.85 -0.78 0.80 1.15 
Market share 
-6.835*** 89.601*** 59.033** -368.921** 
- 
-4.02 2.83 2.57 -2.29 
Market share (deposits) - 
-6.644** 36.130 157.260*** -204.002 
-2.11 1.11 4.37 -0.82 
Market share (loans) - 
4.617 -38.753 -108.576** -93.461 
1.26 -1.25 -2.55 -0.31 
Cost/TI 
-0.358*** 
- - - 
-0.369*** 
- - - 
-3.85 -3.79 
Loan impairment  
0.022 
- - - 
0.082 
- - - 
0.03 0.11 
OBS/TA - - 
29.895 178.205** 
- - 
37.087* 191.014*** 
1.44 2.54 1.80 2.64 
EQ/TA - - - 
-17.541 
- - - 
-26.490 
-0.87 -1.17 
Liquidity 
-0.097 -1.411 
- - 
-0.066 -1.825 
- - 
-1.59 -1.10 -1.08 -1.38 
GDPPC - 
20.913 
- - - 
18.341 
- - 
1.32 1.11 
Private credit - - 
10.877** 3.890 
- - 
5.368 -40.142 
2.55 0.11 1.05 -1.10 
Inflation - - 
0.777 
- - - 
-6.282 
- 
0.02 -0.21 
Legal strength - 
-1.666*** 
- - - 
-1.676*** 
- - 
-3.28 -3.06 
Country effects YES YES 
Time effects NO NO 
R-squared 0.746 0.661 0.781 0.663 0.747 0.664 0.314 0.667 
Obs 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 396 
The table summarizes the results of  ‘other’ banks through two Seemingly Unrelated Regressions, the first one including total assets, market share and concentration apart 
from other controls and country fixed effects and the other analyzing the effect of total assets squared, concentration and market share with respect to deposits and loans. I 
opt to exclude time fixed effects since otherwise standard errors could not be estimated. The estimation allows for correlation among errors across the four models within 
each bank as well as heteroskedasticity by means of bootstrapping. The four models have as independent variables Lerner indexes specific to four distinctive sources of 
bank income: Loans, other interest income, fees/commissions and other non-interest income. T-statistic is reported below each coefficient while asterisks ***, **, * denote 
the significance level being at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively
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